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Talk is not cheap, and speech is not necessarily free. Though
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press. . .,"l the Supreme Court has excepted certain categories
of speech from this protection. Of importance here is the Court's
treatment of sexually explicit speech, whether termed "obscenity" or
merely "indecency." In Roth v. United States,' the Supreme Court
expressly excluded obscenity from the class of speech deserving First
Amendment protection. More than twenty years later in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation,' the Court held that the government may also regulate the
dissemination of indecent speech where minors or unwilling adults are
concerned. Although the Court has altered the doctrinal analyses of
these two categories of speech, many of the fundamental touchstones
remain in place.
As the twenty-first century approaches courts will be faced with the
burdensome task of applying these doctrines to a new form of
technological communication, computer networks.' The courts will
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
3. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
4. For the purposes of this article, the terms "computer networks," "information
superhighway," "Cyberspace," and "Internet" are used interchangeably. Although they
may not be precise substitutes for one another, for the purposes of this article, any
distinctions are not meaningful.
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have to determine whether the relevant characteristics of this new
technology render the older versions of the obscenity and indecency
frameworks inapplicable or outmoded. In general, the courts will have
to strike a delicate balance between the people's right to free speech
and the government's interest in protecting society from offensive
speech. In striking this balance, courts will face difficult issues such as
what speech gives rise to criminal liability, who can be held liable for
such speech, and whether the new technology provides adequate
safeguards to protect society from unwanted exposure to objectionable
speech.
This Article discusses how current law regarding sexually explicit
speech can be applied to the Internet, and the fundamental principles
underlying the current balance between individual rights and
governmental interests. Part I of this Article describes the pertinent
characteristics of computer networks, and discusses the availability of
sexually-oriented materials thereon. Part II analyzes the relevant
evolution of obscenity law. Part III examines one of the major
elements in judging obscenity-the "contemporary community
standard"-and argues in favor of applying a "national community
standard." Part IV explores the relevant law regarding indecent speech
as applied to other communicative media, and discusses the implica-
tions in the context of the Internet. Part V discusses the liability of
computer network operators arising from obscene or indecent
messages posted by network users. Finally, Part VI presents potential




The "information superhighway,"5 touted as the dominant commu-
nications medium of tomorrow, is a global system of interconnected
computer networks. It offers a relatively easy way for anyone with a
computer, modem, and telephone line to instantaneously and
interactively communicate with other people throughout the world.6
5. The term "information superhighway" was first made popular by then-Senator
Al Gore. Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information
Superhighway, 107 HARV. L REV. 1062 n.3 (1994) [hereinafter Message].
6. See Robert F. Goldman, Put Another Log on the Fire, There's a Chill on the Internet:
The Effect of Applying Current Anti-Obscenity Laws to Online Communications, 29 GA. L. REV.
1075, 1083 (1995) (noting that new "World Wide Web" software has made it easier to
access on-line information by integrating the "use of the mouse in a 'point and click'
windows environment with search services which previously would have required greater
computer knowledge"); Eric Handelman, Obscenity and the Internet: Does the Current
[Vol. 22
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OBSCENE AND IMDECENT SPEECH ON THE INTERNET
The Internet is the largest international computer network,7 linking
together more than 40,000 independently managed computer
networks,' including tens of thousands of universities, laboratories,
governmental entities, corporations and individuals in over 100
countries.9 Bound together as a "collection of networks,"" the
Internet is not owned or controlled by a single entity" and has "no
central governing authority."2 So far, it has remained essentially self-
regulated and operates by informal agreement among its users and by
formal agreement among local network operators.'
s
The Internet has attracted approximately thirty million users, 4 a
Obscenity Standard Provide Individuals with the Proper Constitutional Safeguards?, 59 ALB. L.
REV. 709, 737 (1995); Joanna H. Kim, Cyber-Porn Obscenity: The Viability of Local
Community Standards and the Federal Venue Rules in the Computer Network Age, 15 LOY. L.A.
ENT. J. 415, 416-17 (1995); Norman Redlich & David R. Lurie, First Amendment Issues
Presented by the "Information Superhighway", 25 SETON HAL L. REV. 1446-47 (1995).
7. See Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Battle for the Soul of the Internet, TIME, July 25, 1994, at
50. The Internet was originally created by the National Science Foundation in the mid-
1980s. See Kim, supra note 6, at 417. Its principle design feature was to ensure that a
severed link in a connection could easily be circumvented by rerouting, for the purpose
of preventing outages caused by a nuclear or terrorist attack. Carlin Meyer, Reclaiming
Sex From the Pornographers: Cybersexual Possibilities, 83 GEO. LJ. 1969, 1989 n.108 (1995);
Kim, supra note 6, at 418. Thus, from a purely practical standpoint, enforcing
censorship of the Internet may prove to be very difficult.
8. Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway: A Survey of
917,410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stories, and Animations Downloaded 8.5 Million Times by
Consumers in Over 2000 Cities in Forty Countries, Provinces and Territories, 83 GEO. LJ. 1849,
1862 (1995); see Fred H. Cate, The First Amendment and the National Information Infrastruc-
ture, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 36 (1995) (claiming that the actual figure is closer to
45,000 separate networks).
9. Message, supra note 5, at 1066-67 (reporting that commercial network service
providers offer their users a variety of electronic information services, including "sports
scores, news, computer games, and a host of other data bases, some of which even
permit users to download data onto their own computers"); seeWilliam Grimes, Computer
as a Cultural TooL Chatter Mounts on Every Topic, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1992, at C13.
10. M. Ethan Katsh, Rights, Camera, Action: Cyberspatial Settings and the First
Amendment, 104YALE LJ. 1681, 1693 n.37 (1995).
11. Philip Elmer-Dewitt, First Nation in Cyberspace, TIME, Dec. 6, 1993, at 62.
12. See William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to
the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 197, 200-01 (1995).
13. Id.; Jeffrey E. Faucette, The Freedom of Speech at Risk in Cyberspace: Obscenity
Doctrine and a Frightened University's Censorship of Sex on the Internet, 44 DUKE Lj. 1155,
1181 (1995) (claiming that the Internet has managed widespread growth while being
virtually unregulated by government, school or business). Kim, supra note 7, at 419
(theorizing that the Internet currently exists in a "state of suspended anarchy") (quoting
Carla Iazzareschi, Wired: Businesses Create Cyberspace Land Rush on the Internet, LA TIMES,
Aug. 22, 1993, at D2).
14. Cate, supra note 8 at 36. The three largest network providers, CompuServe,
Prodigy and America Online, have almost 6 million subscribers alone. Id.
1996]
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number which has grown exponentially in just the past few years. 15
It is predicted that the number of Internet users will reach 100 million
by 1998, with close to one billion people hooking into Cyberspace by
early next century. 6 Through the Internet, users can access the
Usenet, a collection of more than 14,000 newsgroups which allows
users to discuss an infinite variety of topics. 7 Usenet services are
similar to Bulletin Board Services (BBS), which also offer users the
opportunity to share information and communicate with other users.
However, a BBS does not have a diffuse configuration like the Usenet,
but rather it is usually operated from a central location a by a system
operator (sysop).19 Furthermore, a user must generally subscribe to
the BBS to gain access to its files.20
Presently, there are two general categories of network services
available through the Internet: (1) computer-mediated communica-
tion services, which allow users to communicate through electronic
mail, bulletin boards and conferencing systems; and (2) resource
sharing services, which grant access to databases and files.2' Current
technology enables computer users to scan images from printed
sources or create life-like computer generated images, and store these
images in their computers.22  Current technology also enables
computer users to upload (send), download (receive) or view both text
15. See Cate, supra note 8, at 36 (estimating that the Internet is growing by 750,000
new users per month); Goldman supra, note 6, at 1081 (stating that the growth of new
users, which is between 15% and 25% per month, is so rapid that estimated figures are
obsolete long before they are published).
16. PAUL GILSTER, THE NEW INTERNET NAVIGATOR 19 (1995). The term
"Cyberspace" was coined by William Gibson in his novel "Neuromancer." EDWARD A.
CAvAzos & GAVINO, CYBERSPACE AND THE LAW: YOUR RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN THE ON-
LINE WORLD 1 (1994).
17. Goldman, supra note 6, at 1086 (stating that Usenet newsgroups may offer an
area of special interest to attract "like-minded users"); see Faucette, supra note 13, at
1162 (maintaining that messages posted to the Usenet are only temporary, and are
usually removed within a few days of posting to make room for new messages).
18. See Rimm, supra note 8, at 1863-64.
19. Note, PC Peep Show: Computers, Privacy, and Child Pornography, 27 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 989, 993 (1994) [hereinafter Peep]. This article uses the term "sysop" in
reference to system operators of networks, regardless of the type of computer network
structure involved.
20. Rimm, supra note 8, at 1864.
21. Peep, supra note 19, at 993 n.22; see Cate, supra note 8, at 36 (stating that there
are also three types of service providers: users, electronic service providers who offer on-
line services, and intermediaries who supply the equipment necessary to link users to
each other and to service providers).
22. See Handelman, supra note 6, at 710 (suggesting one can easily scan
photographic images to achieve "photo-realistic quality"); David B. Johnson, Why the
Posseusion of Computer-Generated Child Pornography can be Constitutionally Prohibited, 4 ALB.
LJ. Sci. & TECH. 311, 314 (1994); Rimm, supra note 8, at 1864.
[Vol. 22
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and graphic images through the Internet.25 What does all this
technological capability mean? How easy is it for adults or children to
access pornography through computer networks?
B. Availability of Pornography on the Internet: What's Out There?
At some point in history, virtually every form of communication has
been used to transmit messages pertaining to sex, and governments
have attempted, and sometimes succeeded to regulate such uses.
24
Thus, it should not be too surprising that computer networks have
recently become the center of legislative attention,25 since they are
the medium of the 1990s by which the growing market for sexually-
oriented materials can satisfy its desires. 26  Although computer
pornography has existed since the early 1980s, its availability has only
become widespread in recent years due to the growth of BBSsY BBS
operators can scan (porno)graphic images onto their computer hard
drives and transmit them to anyone with a computer and modem. In
turn, the recipients can then download and display the images without
much effort.28 The recent proliferation of Internet pornography can
be attributed to the fact that computer users can indulge their fantasies
in the privacy of their own home.29 It can also be attributed to the
23. Rimm, supra note 8, at 1864 (claiming that images obtained from private BBSs
are much easier to view since they do not need to be encoded or decoded).
24. See, e.g., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)
(upholding regulation of obscene commercial telephone messages, but striking down
indecency regulation of the same); FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding
regulations of indecent broadcast speech); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(affirming conviction of using the mail to transport obscene literature); Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (holding obscene films not constitutionally
protected); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding total ban on
distribution of indecent speech through cable television unconstitutionally overbroad);
Gerard Van der Leun, Twilight Zone of the Id, TIME, March 22, 1995, at 36.
25. See infra note 40 and accompanying text (describing legislative efforts to control
access by minors to indecent messages).
26. SeeKim, supranote 6, at420 (citing Barry W. Lynn, "Civil Rights" Ordinances and
the Attorney General's Commission: New Developments in Pornography Regulation, 21 HARV.
C.R.-C.L L REV. 27, 30 (1986)); see also Ronald KL Collins & David M. Skover, The
Pornographic Stat, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1374, 1382 (1994) (reporting that Americans spend
nearly ten billion dollars annually on pornographic magazines, films, phone sex and
videos) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BEYOND THE PORNOGRAPHY COMMISSION: THE
FEDERAL RESPONSE 6 (1988)).
27. Kim, supra note 6, at 420; Handelman, supra note 7, at 709.
28. Rimm, supra note 8, at 1864. Furthermore, CD-ROM technology now makes
it relatively simple to acquire large quantities of pornographic images at little cost. Id.
at 1914.
29. Rimm, supra note 8, at 1852 (stating that computer users can now avoid the
embarrassment of walking into an adult book store). But see Anne Wells Branscomb,
Internet Babylon? Does the Carnegie Mellon Study of Pornography on the Information
19961
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ease with which users can download such images."0
Although large commercial Internet service providers generally do
not carry hard core pornographic materials,1 a research team at
Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) recently discovered that there was
a great deal of sexually explicit materials available elsewhere on the
Internet. 2 The CMU study found that approximately one-third of the
most frequently visited Usenet newsgroups were identified as porno-
graphic," and that nearly eighty-five percent of all images posted on
the Usenet were pornographic.3 4 However, not all of the nearly 170
Superhighway Reveal a Threat to the Stability of Society?, 83 GEO. L.J. 1935, 1942 n.33 (1995)
(suggesting that the notion of privacy on computer networks may be a fallacy because
most accounts and downloading efforts are identifiable and can be disclosed).
30. Rimm, supra note 8, at 1852. Moreover, it has become easier to market to an
ever-expanding audience because of the fear of AIDS and other sexually transmitted
diseases. Id.; see Pamela A. Huelster, Cybersex and Community Standards, 73 B.U. L. REV.
865, 869, (1995) (estimating that the distribution of erotic materials through the
Internet will be a "three- to five billion-dollar industry within five years").
31. See Rimm, supra note 8, at 1861. But see Meyer, supra note 7, at 1970-71
(claiming that CompuServe offers a library feature that includes nude women).
Recently, CompuServe decided to block access to over 200 newsgroups relating to sex,
where users could post messages, including text, graphics, and sound. Germans,
CompuServe disagree on Ban Details, STAR TIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 3, 1996, at 6A.
CompuServe's action was apparently prompted by German officials who threatened
prosecution, although the prosecutors deny making explicit threats. Id. Nonetheless,
because CompuServe could not effectively prevent its German users from accessing
certain forums, it decided to block access to all of its 4 million subscribers. Cyberporn,
Limited Access Sparks Free-Speech Row, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Dec. 30, 1995, at 10A.
Critics charged that CompuServe's response "opens the door to other national
governments imposing their own restrictions, ... [even if the content is not] sexually
explicit." Id. (quoting Marc Rotenburg, executive director of the Electronic Privacy
Information Center).
32. See generally Rimm, supra note 8 (surveying 917,410 pornographic images,
descriptions, short stories and animations and their various locations on the Internet
and discussing the CMU study of pornographic material on the Internet). But see Philip
Elmer-Dewitt, Fire Storm on the Computer Nets: A New Study of Cyberporn, Reported in a Time
Cover Story, Sparks Controversy, TIME, July 24, 1995, at 57 (criticizing CMU's study as
exaggerating the extent of Internet porn because it confused "findings from private
adult bulletin-board systems that require credit cards for payments (and are off limits
to minors) with those from the public networks (which are not)").
33. Rimm, supra note 8, at 1870; see Faucette, supra note 13, at 1163 (noting that
USA Today reported that, "monthly compilation of the most trafficked Usenet
newsgroups ... shows that three of the top 10 are sex-related: alt.sex.stories,
altbinaries.pictures.erotica, and alt.sex.").
34. Rimm, supra note 8, at 1914 (reporting that 71% of Usenet porn comes from
commercial BBSs). However, the total Internet traffic associated with Usenet
newsgroups containing pornographic imagery was only 2.5%. Id. at 1869. But see
Elmer-Dewitt, Fire Storm, supra note 32, at 57 (claiming that porn files represent less
than one-half of one percent of all messages posted on the Internet). Although the
CMU study reveals that much of the pornography is pedophilia and bestiality, the
researchers found nothing which cannot be purchased in specialty magazines or adult
[Vol. 22
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newsgroups that relate to sex can be classified as pornographic. 5
There are newsgroups devoted to "safe sex, responsible sexual conduct,
tolerance for homosexuality, racial tolerance, and equality between the
sexes."36 Moreover, merely accessing newsgroups containing porno-
graphic images does not mean that these images will come roaring
across the computer screen. Generally, accessing sexually explicit BBSs
or discussion groups requires the user to "go past a password and a
warning label."37 As the CMU research team discovered, pornograph-
ic BBSs generally require the user to provide a real name, address, date
of birth, password, and read a legal disclaimer. Furthermore, approxi-
mately one-half also require photocopies of a driver's license with
proof of age before granting access.38 More importantly, a user must
take additional affirmative steps to download the unencoded images,
use a separate application to decode the image, and use yet another
program to view the image. 9 Thus, there is little chance that
individuals will unexpectedly stumble across objectionable materials on
their venture through the cyberworld.
However, Congress was not convinced of the adequacy of these
safeguards when it recently passed the Communications Decency Act,
making it a federal crime to knowingly transmit or make available
obscene materials through the Internet.4" Although this law is the
bookstores. See Rimm, supra note 9, at 1885; Philip Elmer-Dewitt, On a Screen Near Yow
Cybeiporn, TIME, July 3, 1995, at 40.
35. Meyer, supra note 7, at 1984-85.
36. Faucette, supra note 13, at 1163; see Goldman, supra note 6, at 1086-87 (stating
that some discussion groups are devoted to sex in a therapeutic sense, and some may
not be devoted to sex, but may still contain pornography); Meyer, supra note 7, at 1985
(reporting that there are newsgroups classified under sex which are devoted to "politics"
and "news," and even a Christian discussion group about sex).
37. Meyer, supra note 7, at 1969 n.4 (quoting David R. Johnson, Traveling in
Cyberspace, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 3, 1995, at 26).
38. See Huelster, supra note 30, at 872-73 (stating that BBS services generally
prescreen applicants and require them to sign subscription agreements); Elmer-Dewitt,
supra note 34, at 40 (claiming that private adult BBSs are off limits to minors, who
would "have to master some fairly daunting computer science before they can turn so-
called binary files on the Usenet into high-resolution color pictures").
39. Faucette, supra note 13, at 1164.
40. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
The Act also prohibits the transmission of indecent messages to minors, and provides
fines up to $100,000 or two years imprisonment for violations of either the obscenity
or indecency provisions. Id. Shortly after this bill was signed by President Clinton, the
American Civil Liberties Union and 19 other groups asked a federal judge in
Philadelphia to block the "indecency" provision, arguing that "it lacks definition and
smacks of censorship." Gautam Naik, Landmark Telecom Bill Becomes Law, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 9, 1996, at B3; see ACLU v. Reno, 1996 WL65464 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 15, 1996).
The Senate version of this bill had passed by a margin of 84 to 16 shortly after its
sponsor, Nebraska SenatorJames Exon, exhibited at his desk a "blue book" containing
1996]
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first congressional attempt to censor on-line speech, it merely adds to
the federal arsenal in combating sexually explicit materials transmitted
through various communicative media." To some, it may seem a
mere continuation of the government's perceived paternalistic role in
protecting society by ferreting out speech which does not conform to
the sensibilities of the sensitive. Yet the government does, to some
extent, possess the legitimate right to impose protective restrictions on
speech, so long as those restrictions do not unduly inhibit the free flow
of communication between consenting adults. Thus, a careful balance
must be struck between individuals' right to free speech and the
government's right to exercise its protective capacity.
II. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF
OBSCENIIY
A. In the Beginning
Prior to the 1940s, it was merely assumed that obscenity received no
First Amendment protection.42  A 1942 Supreme Court decision
reflected this assumption when the Court stated, in dicta: "There are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise
any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene."
4
1
Fifteen years later, the Supreme Court converted this assumption
into law in Roth v. United States, when it held that First Amendment
protection of free speech does not extend to obscenity.44 In Roth, the
Court stated that First Amendment protection was "fashioned to assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people."45 In other words, it protects
"ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance."46
However, because obscenity was considered "utterly without redeeming
social importance," it fell outside the scope of First Amendment
some of the rawer images available on-line. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 34, at 42.
41. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1988) (prohibiting the use of mails to distribute
obscene materials); 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (a)-(b) (1988) (prohibiting the importation or
transportation of obscene materials); 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988) (prohibiting obscene
broadcasts); 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1988) (prohibiting the importation or transportation of
obscene materials for the purpose of sale or distribution); 18 U.S.C. § 2251-54 (West
Supp. 1993) (prohibiting child pornography).
42. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957).
43. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (emphasis added).
44. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
45. Id. at 484.
46. Id. (finding full protection for unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, and ideas
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion).
[Vol. 22
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protection."
The Roth Court defined obscenity as "material which deals with sex
in a manner appealing to prurient interest."8 Thus, the factual
question to ask in identifying obscenity was "whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.""
In 1966, a plurality of the Court elaborated on Roth and articulated a
new three-part test for obscenity in A Book Named :John Cleland's
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts.
[I] t must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the
material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary
community standards relating to the description or representation of
sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming
social value. 
°
Since the prosecution was required to prove a negative beyond a
reasonable doubt-that the material was utterly without redeeming
social value-the third prong of Memoirs made it almost impossible to
prosecute obscenity cases.5
B. Then There Was Miller
Recognizing the inadequacies of the Memoirs test, and rejecting the
"utterly without redeeming social value" analysis, the Supreme Court
47. Id. at 484-85.
48. Id. at 487. The Court also stated that sex and obscenity are not synonymous.
Id. Therefore, while not all pornography is necessarily obscenity, all obscenity must
necessarily be pornographic.
49. Id. at 489. The Court expressly rejected the leading English case which held
that obscenity is to be judged by the effect of a single passage upon a particularly
susceptible person. Id. at 488-89 (citing Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R. 360 (Q.B. 1868)).
Under the Hicklin test, adopted at one time by many American courts, the following
works were held obscene: Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer and Tropic of Capricorn, United
States v. Two Obscene Books, 99 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Cal. 1951), affd sb twm., Besig v.
United States, 208 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953); Theodore Dreiser's An American Tragedy,
Commonwealth v. Friede, 171 N.E. 472 (Mass. 1930); D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chattery's
Lover, Commonwealth v. Delacy, 171 N.E. 455 (Mass. 1930); see P. Heath Brockwell,
Comment, Grappling With Miller v. California: The Search for an Alternative Approach to
Regtlating Obscenity, 24 CUMB. L REv. 131, 131-32 (1993) (discussing the Hicklin case);
Mary C. Mertz Parnell, Applying Community Standards to International Direct Broadcasting
Satellites: Can the United States Know Obscenity Wthout Seeing It, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L
L. REV. 473, 487-88 n.62 (1994) (discussing differing applications of obscenity standards
between the United States, Japan, and West Germany).
50. John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure"v. Massachusetts 383 U.S. 413,418
(1966).
51. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22, 24-25 (1973); E. Edward Bruce,
Prostitution and Obscenity: A Comment Upon the Attorney General's Report on Pornography, 1987
DUKE L.J. 123, 126 (1987).
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once again sought to formulate a more objective definition of
obscenity in Miller v. California.5 2  The Miller test incorporated a
slightly altered three-factor test:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
53
The Miller Court expressly limited obscenity to patently offensive "hard-
core" pornography,5 4 and held that the determination of the first two
prongs (prurient interest and patent offensiveness) are made by a jury
applying contemporary community standards, not a national stan-
dard.5 However, the Court later held in Smith v. United States,6 that
the third prong (serious value) must be determined by applying a
52. Mi//er, 413 U.S. at 15. The Miller decision was the first time since Roth that a
majority of the Court had agreed on a test for obscenity. RONALD D. ROTUNDA &JOHN
E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.60, at
318 (1992).
53. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24. The Court later held that material which provokes only
normal, healthy sexual desires could not be considered obscene; rather, the material
must appeal to a "shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion." Brockett
v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 497 (1985) (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 487 n.20).
54. Miller, 413 U.S. at 27. While the Court did not define "hard-core" pornogra-
phy, it recited two examples of sexually explicit materials that a State could define for
regulation: "(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts,
normal or perverted, actual or simulated; and, (b) Patently offensive representation or
descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals."
Id. at 25.
The Court in New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), held that child pornogra-
phy, even if not legally obscene, may be constitutionally prohibited. In granting states
greater leeway in regulating child pornography, the Court identified five compelling
interests justifying its suppression: (1) "safeguarding the physical and psychological
well-being of a minor," id. at 756-57; (2) the creation and distribution of child
pornography is based upon the sexual abuse of children, id. at 759; (3) the ability to
make money in the distribution of child pornography provides individuals with the
incentive to partake in illegal activity, id. at 761; (4) the value of child pornography is
"exceedingly modest, if not de minimis," id. at 762; and (5) child pornography does not
fall within the protections of the First Amendment, id at 763.
55. Miler, 413 U.S. at 37. While holding that a national community standard
applied, the Court held that a material's appeal to prurient sexual interest is to be
judged according to its impact on the average person, rather than on a particularly
sensitive one. Id. at 33. Furthermore, in two companion cases to Mil/er, the Court held
that the obscenity standards applicable to state legislation are equally applicable to
federal legislation, and that written words, as well as pictures, could also be considered
obscene. See Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973); United States v. 12,200-
Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 129-30 (1973).
56. 431 U.S. 291, 301 (1977).
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national standard.-"
The Miller Court required the use of "contemporary community
standards" to ensure that allegedly obscene material is "judged by its
impact on an average person, rather than a particularly susceptible or
sensitive person-or indeed a totally insensitive one."18 In Jenkins v.
Georgia, the Court went one step further and held that, despite the
jury's role in making determinations of obscenity, the reviewing court
must undertake an independent review of the facts.59 In Jenkins, a
jury found the defendant guilty of distributing obscene materials when
he showed the Hollywood film Carnal Knowledge in a Georgia movie
theater.' The Court thought "it would be a serious misreading of
Miller to conclude that juries have unbridled discretion in determining
what is 'patently offensive.'"61 While independent appellate review
was aimed at preventing convictions by particularly sensitive or
insensitive juries,Justice Brennan proclaimed that "one cannot say with
certainty that material is obscene until at least five members of this
Court, applying inevitably obscure standards, have pronounced it
so."
62
C. Private Possession Versus Public Distribution
The Supreme Court, in Stanley v. Georgia, held that while the
government may regulate the public distribution of obscenity, it could
57. The question of whether the same material, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value was later required to be determined by
applying a "reasonable person" standard. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501 n.3
(1987) (stating that "the mere fact that only a minority of a population may believe a
work has serious value does not mean the 'reasonable person' standard would not be
met.").
58. Miller, 413 U.S. at 33.
59. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160-61 (1974). Although independent
appellate review is deemed to be an additional safeguard for free speech, consider the
following appellate judge's description of Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer.
"Cancer" is not a book. It is a cesspool, an open sewer, a pit of putrefaction,
a slimy gathering of all that is rotten in the debris of human depravity. And
the center of all this waste and stench, besmearing himself with its foulest
defilement, splashes, leaps, cavorts and wallows a bifurcated specimen that
responds to the name of Henry Miller.
Commonwealth v. Robin, 218 A.2d 546, 556 (Pa. 1966).
60. Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 154.
61. Id. at 160.
62. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 92 (1973) (Brennan,J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan's reasoning follows from the fact that speech is presumed to be legally
non-obscene until the trier of fact has so concluded, and that the appellate courts must
conduct an independent review of the jury's or trial court's determination. See Fort
Wayne Books, Inc. v. Kentucky, 489 U.S. 46, 62 (1989);Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 160; Roaden
v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973); Mitler, 413 U.S. at 25.
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not regulate the same in the privacy of one's home.s The Court
proclaimed: "If the First Amendment means anything, it means that
a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house,
what books he may read or what films he may watch."' Although the
Stanley Court declared that the Constitution forbids legislation aimed
at controlling an individual's private thoughts,' it has since been
unwilling to extend this protection beyond the confines of the
home.66 Thus, while "the private possession of obscene materials in
the home is protected activity, virtually any process that leads to such
possession may be declared illegal."67
III. COMMUNITY STANDARDS: AN ARGUMENT FOR A NATIONAL
OBSCENITY STANDARD
In Miller v. California, the Court held that the first two prongs of the
obscenity definition-what appeals to the prurient interest and what is
patently offensive-are determined by applying community standards,
not national standards.68 However, the Court has since held that
Miller did not mandate use of a national standard; instead, the trial
court may instruct the jury to apply a "community standard" without
specifying which community.69 Thus, a juror may be instructed to
draw on his knowledge of "the views of the average person in the
63. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
64. Id. at 565; see Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 654 (1968) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "Big Brother can no more say what a person shall listen to or
read than he can say what shall be published."). However, the government may
constitutionally proscribe the private possession and viewing of child pornography which
is not legally obscene. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); see supra note 54
(explaining the rationale behind the Court's separate treatment of child pornography).
65. Stany, 394 U.S. at 566.
66. See, e.g., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989)
(upholding FCC regulation of obscenity transmitted over the telephone); United States
v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) (rejecting the right to receive, transport or distribute
obscene materials in interstate commerce); United States v. 12,200-Ft. Reels of Super
8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 128 (1973) (upholding the United States' right to prohibit
importation of obscene materials, even if intended solely for private or personal use and
possession); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971) (denying the right to receive
obscene materials through the mail); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402
U.S. 363 (1971) (holding that Stanky does not give rise to a right to sell or give
obscene materials to others).
67. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 52, § 20.61, at 322-23. In theory, it may still
be possible to prosecute individuals who privately possessed obscenity, because they
would have had to violate an obscenity transportation law in order to get the material
into their home; that is, unless they actually created the material inside their home.
68. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973).
69. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87,
104-05 (1974); see Smith v. United States, 431 U.S 291, 303 (1977) (stating that the
question of community standards "is not one that can be defined legislatively").
(Vol. 22
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community or vicinage from which he comes."70
The question of whether the community standard should reflect a
national, state, or a more localized standard has been the source of
much debate. The Supreme Court has expressly rejected a constitution-
al requirement of a national standard for obscenity, arguing that such
a standard is unprovable, and it would be unreasonable to expect
courts to enunciate one.7' Furthermore, the Miller Court asserted
that a national standard would require people in one part of the
country to accept offensive depictions of sexual conduct found
tolerable in another part of the country.
72
The application of local or state community standards has both
constitutional and practical drawbacks, especially when applied to
sexually explicit materials on the Internet. First, any local definition
of a community should not be employed to delineate "the area of
expression that is protected by the Federal Constitution."7 1 In
Jacobellis v. Ohio, the Court stated that it "has explicitly refused to
tolerate a result whereby 'the constitutional limits of free expression in
the Nation would vary with state lines.'" 74  Second, applying either
state or local standards has the practical effect of suppressing speech
which the government cannot constitutionally suppress directly.
75
Since the varied standards existing in each locale are impossible to
discern, disseminators of allegedly obscene materials may legitimately
fear the risk of being criminally prosecuted in any remote communi-
70. Hamling 418 U.S. at 104.
71. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184,200 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). In Miller
v. Ca/iforia, the Court also reasoned:
[O] ur nation is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably
expect that such standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single
formulation, even assuming the prerequisite consensus exists.... To require
a State to structure obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national
.community standard" would be an exercise in futility.
413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973).
72. Mir, 413 U.S. at 32 ("It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read
the First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public
depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas or New York City."); sm Rimm, supra
note 8, at 1897 n.94. Rimm alleges that the heart of Mi/erwas to enable communities
"desiring to exclude marginally valuable sexual expression [to] be able to do so without
regard to the status of similar expression in other communities." Id. (citing Mier, 413
U.S. at 30-34).
73. Jacobelis, 378 U.S. at 193 (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by Goldberg, J.).
74. Id. at 194-95 (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946)).
75. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 144 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Contra Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 n.13 (1973) (stating that nationwide
standards will have the same chilling effect on speech in communities whose tolerance
of the materials is greater than the national average).
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ty.7" Because such fear may inevitably force self-censorship, it could
restrict the public's access to constitutionally protected materials."
Thus, communities in which the material might otherwise be permitted
would be denied their right of access to those materials.7'
The third criticism of state or local standards is that such standards
are just as hypothetical and unascertainable as a national standard.79
Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion in Smith v. United States,
asserted that the most compelling reason for rejecting a national
standard for obscenity applies equally to the use of local or state
standards." He argued that the "diversity within the Nation which
makes a single standard of offensiveness impossible to identify is also
present within each of the so-called local communities in which
litigation of this kind is prosecuted."8" Thus, whether certain speech
is offensive to state or local community standards is not a question that
could be expected to produce a fair and consistent result.
8 2
The fourth, and perhaps most compelling, reason to adopt a
national obscenity standard, at least in the context of the Internet, is
illustrated by a recent criminal prosecution for distributing porno-
graphic materials over a computer network. In United States v. Thomas,
a couple who operated an adult bulletin board service from California
76. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 143-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Ginzburg v. United
States, Justice Black argued:
[T] he guilt or innocence of a defendant charged with obscenity must depend
in the final analysis upon ... particular individuals and the place where the
trial is held. And one must remember that the Federal Government has the
power to try a man for mailing obscene matter in a court 3,000 miles from his
home.
383 U.S. 463, 480 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
77. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959).
78. But see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (citing Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948)) (holding that First Amendment protection of free speech
extends to a person's right to receive "information and ideas, regardless of their social
worth.").
79. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 314 (1977) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 313.
81. Id. at 313-14. Justice Stevens further argued that the assumption in Miller that
jurors could more easily "draw on standards of their community" was misconceived. Id.
at 314 n.10. He explained:
[This] assumption can only relate to isolated communities where jurors are
well enough acquainted with members of their community to know their
private tastes and values. The assumption does not apply to most segments
of our diverse, mobile, metropolitan society. For surely, the standard for a
metropolitan area isjust as "hypothetical and unascertainable" as any national
standard.
Id.
82. Id. at 315.Justice Stevens also noted that, since the record never discloses what
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were convicted on obscenity charges in Memphis, Tennessee."3
Operating from a district in San Francisco, where essentially
"anything goes,"84 Robert and Carleen Thomas offered their services
to paying customers only. 5 The government set up a sting operation
and downloaded many of the materials from a computer in Memphis,
Tennessee, then extradited the couple from California to stand trial on
obscenity charges in Memphis. At trial, the jury was instructed to apply
the standards of Memphis in determining whether the material from
California was obscene. Robert and Carleen Thomas were convicted
on ten counts of interstate transmission of obscene images, and were
sentenced to thirty-seven and thirty months in prison respectively.8 6
On appeal, the Thomases, and amicus curiae,8 7 argued that "the
computer technology requires a new definition of community, i.e., one
that is based on the broad-ranging connections among people in
cyberspace rather than the geographic locale of the federal judicial
district of the criminal trial." a However, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected this claim, and affirmed the Thomases' conviction. a9
I Although the Thomas court correctly followed existing law regarding
community standards, it is more appropriate to apply a national
standard for Internet communications." Applying local or state
83. United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
84. Symposium, Panel II: Censorship On the Internet: Do Obscene or Pornographic
Materials Have A Protected Status?, 5 FORD. INTELL PROP., MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 279, 292
(1995); cf. Huelster, supra note 30, at 866 (claiming that San Jose law enforcement
officials had previously determined that the Thomases' materials on their bulletin
boards did not violate the obscenity standards of San Jose) (citing David J. Loundy,
Whose Standards? Whose Community?, CHi. DAILY L. BULL., Aug. 1, 1994, at 5).
85. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 705; Donna Gallagher, Free Speech on the Line: Modern
Technology and the First Amendment, 3 COMLAw CONSPECTUS 197, 202 (1995).
86. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 706.
87. Id. at 711. The American Civil Liberties Union, the Interactive Services
Association, the Society for Electronic Access, and The Electronic Frontier Foundation
all submitted briefs on behalf of the Thomases. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 716.
90. See Dennis W. Chiu, Obscenity on the Internet: Local Community Standards for
Obscenity are Unworkable on the Information Superhighway, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 185, 211-
17 (1995) (arguing that the needs of the local community should be weighed against
the threat to individual liberties, which provides more notice as to what conduct is
prohibited); Handelman, supra note 7, at 710, 714-731 (arguing that the differences
between the Internet and the "tangible" world render application of Millers obscenity
standard inappropriate to Internet communications);John V. Edwards, Note, Obscenity
in the Age of Direct Broadcast Satellite: A Final Burial for Stanley v. Georgia?, a National
Obscenity Standard, and Other Miscellany, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 949 (1992) (discussing
obscenity laws with regard to direct satellite broadcasts); Randolph Stuart Sergent, Note,
Sex, Candor, and Computers: Obscenity and Indecency on the Electronic Frontier, 10J.L. & POL.
703, 730 (1994) (stating that it would be "impossible ... to determine the community
standards in every town in America"). At least one commentator has argued in favor
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standards encourages prosecutors to forum shop for ajurisdiction from
which to download Internet material, logically choosing the most
conservative districts to ensure a conviction. However, the practical
effect of this strategy is that every computer user must conform their
speech to the most conservative jurisdiction with a telephone line.
Thus, the so-called "Bible-belt" community standard will be engrafted
upon the entire nation, and essentially become the national stan-
dard. 91
In Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, the Supreme Court
addressed a similar issue in the context of obscene messages sent over
the telephone.9 The Court rejected Sable's claim that a local
standard "places message senders in a 'double-bind' by compelling
them to tailor their messages to the least tolerant community."95
Though Sable could be subjected to varying community standards in
which it transmits its messages, that alone was not grounds to apply a
national standard because Sable was free to tailor its messages
selectively to the communities it served.9' Thus, the Court was not
sympathetic to national disseminators who "may be forced to incur some
costs in developing and implementing a system for screening the locale
of incoming calls."
95
The Thomas court adopted Sable's reasoning and stated that, like
Sable, the Thomases were free to selectively tailor their messages to the
communities they chose to serve. 96 Moreover, the court in Thomas
focused on the fact that the Thomases"had in place methods to limit
user access in jurisdictions where the risk of finding obscenity was
greater than that in California. They knew they had a member in
Memphis; the member's address and local phone number were
provided on his application form.""
However, the court limited its holding to the facts of the case, and
was able to avoid deciding the constitutional issue of whether a new
of a "virtual community" standard. Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and
Accountability: Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1654
(1995); Gallagher, supra note 85, at 202; Kim, supra note 6, at 430. However, there will
likely come a time when enough of our nation is connected to the Internet that the
distinction between the "virtual community" and the real-world communities will vanish.
91. See Huelster, supra note 30, at 865-66; Peter D. Kennedy &James A. Hemphill,
Publishing on the Internet: Pitfalls and Protections, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 33, 35 (1995).
92. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); see infra notes
134-41 and accompanying text describing Sables holding with respect to indecency
regulations.
93. Sabe, 492 U.S. at 124.
94. Id. at 125.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 712 (6th Cir. 1996).
97. Id. at 711.
[Vol. 22
16
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 16
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol22/iss2/16
OBSCENE AND INDECENT SPEECH ON THE INTERNET
definition of "community" was necessary "for use on obscenity
prosecutions involving electronic bulletin boards.""8 Therefore,
bulletin board operators will have to wait for another court, working
with different facts, to determine the fate of that issue.
However, Sable does give us some insight into what the future holds
for "community standards" on the Internet. While the Sable Court held
that imposing some costs on national disseminators of sexually explicit
telephone messages does not violate the First Amendment, it did not
determine what level of costs could constitutionally be imposed.9" In
addition, the Court did not consider whether the same analysis might
apply if the technology to tailor messages to selective communities was
simply unavailable."°
Sable presupposes that, although there are some costs involved, the
"dial-a-porn" service provider does have the ability to tailor its messages
to the communities it chooses to serve. In the context of the Internet,
such reasoning should apply, if at all, only to those service providers
that affirmatively market sexually-related materials to a national
market.' By affirmatively marketing nationally, these distributors
arguably accept the risk of violating obscenity laws in locales that may
deem the materials "patently offensive." The same should not be true
for access providers or network operators, who could not feasibly
screen each of the millions of communication transactions that occur
every day, let alone tailor such messages to the appropriate communi-
ties.
1 02
98. Id. at 712 (stating that one of the cardinal rules of the federal courts is "never
reach constitutional questions not squarely presented by the facts of a case").
99. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 125 (1989) (emphasis
added).
100. It is unclear whether the technology to selectively tailor messages to particular
regions is yet available. See infra notes 101-03. However, if the technology can be
developed and employed at a minimum expense, then Sable would arguably foreclose
the likelihood of establishing a national standard for national distributors of sexually-
explicit materials through the Internet. The question, as in all balancing tests, should
be whether the technology is cheap enough so as not to unduly inhibit free speech, by
forcing distributors out of business.
101. Compar United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 711 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that
the Thomases easily could, and actually did, know where their subscribers lived) with
Kim, supra note 6, at 425 (claiming that even BBS operators "cannot completely block
calls from any given community") and Chiu, supra note 90, at 208 (comparing a BBS
to a regular phone system to illustrate the difficulty of preventing calls from a different
jurisdiction) and Huelster, supra note 30, at 870 (arguing that sysops have no control
over the destination of the materials) and Sergent, supra note 90, at 731 (finding a
weakness in the Sable argument because of its impossible application to large
information networks).
102. See Huelster, supra note 30, at 868 (stating that sysops can delete individual
messages but not every transmission). Another problem arises from the fact that users
of BBSs, which require passwords, can access the BBS from any computer in the world.
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Furthermore, applying local or state standards to sexual materials on
the Internet, which has no meaningful or geographical boundaries,'05
ignores the policy considerations underlying the Miller test for
obscenity. The foundation for the Miller test was the assumption that
certain sexually explicit materials were offensive to particular communi-
ties, and that these communities should be able to insulate themselves
from such materials. °'4 However, the manner in which Internet
communications occur erodes this rationale for applying anything less
than a national standard.105
One commentator contends that application of a local standard to
Cyberspace transactions fails "to recognize the distinction between
cyberspace transaction and their physical analogues."0 6  Unlike
obscenity passing through a community via the mail, which has a
negligible impact on that community, electronic communications do
not have a similar impact on the community through which they
pass.' O7 Until they reach the user's computer, the communications
are merely a series of electrical impulses requiring computer software
to decode them. 'I Furthermore, since both parties to such commu-
nications are usually located in their own homes, Stanley would suggest
that the government cannot proscribe this conduct.'"
Thus, even if the BBS uses an application form to ensure that the subscriber lives in a
region where the material is acceptable, the subscriber could use the password to
download the same information from a location where the material is considered
obscene.
.103. Chiu, supra note 90, at 209 (determining that local community standards are
no longer viable in the advent of the information superhighway); Kennedy, supra note
91, at 35 (stating that cyberspace transcends traditional geographical boundaries); Kim,
supra note 6, at 430 (finding assumptions of geographic boundaries to be erroneous).
104. See Rimm, supra note 8, at 1896 (assessing material according to the standards
of the community where it is purchased or received).
105. See Handelman, supra note 6, at 731 (asserting that, unlike newsstands, book
stores and movie theaters, material accessed through the Internet is not within the
community's view).
106. Byassee, supra note 12, at 209; cf. Symposium, supra note 84, at 292 (arguing
that the district court in Thomas looked at the 'wrong community or the wrong
geographical region").
107. Chiu, supra note 90, at 205 (stating that discreet computer transmissions are
not exposed to anyone except the computer users).
108. Byassee, supra note 12, at 209-10 (asserting that, at least with respect to adult
services that can only be accessed through affirmative measures conducted in the
privacy of one's home, there is no danger that the surrounding community will be
offended by this secret or private viewing). However, where there truly does exist a
genuine impact beyond the cyber-community, as in the case where local children are
used as models for on-line pornography, then a local community standard may be
appropriate. See Branscomb, supra note 90, at 1653; Branscomb, supra note 29, at 1949.
109. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). But cf. United States v. Orito, 413 U.S.
139 (1973) (holding that the federal government could regulate interstate transporta-
tion of obscenity on the basis of a mere risk of exposure to juveniles or the public).
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As an illustration of the dilemma imposed upon Internet providers
of sexually-oriented materials, compare the Thomas case" ° with the
same exact transaction conducted in-person rather than through a
computer network. Assume that a Tennessee resident enters an adult
book store in California and purchases materials that are not obscene
in California, then sends them back to his home in Tennessee where
they are considered obscene. At the time of purchase, no crime has
been committed; however, the purchaser's transportation of the
materials to Tennessee might render the purchaser criminally
liable."'
If the same transaction occurs solely through the Internet, then the
same material winds up in Tennessee. As far as the seller is con-
cerned, there is little or no significant legal reason to distinguish
between these two transactions. In both instances, the seller in
California made available the materials, and the purchaser was solely
responsible for any subsequent dissemination and violation of
Tennessee's community standards." 2 Thus, while the Thomases
would have committed no crime had the purchaser physically traveled
to California and picked up the materials, they could be, and actually
were, prosecuted for essentially the same transaction occurring in
Cyberspace. It is this inconsistency that challenges the rationale
behind the Court's refusal to recognize that our federal Constitution
should not be compromised merely because various communities want
to control the content of speech passing through their
boundaries-without regard to whether the communication has any
significant impact outside the home of transacting parties.
In summary, anything less than a national standard for judging
obscenity disregards the fact that our Constitution knows no state
boundaries,"' and would have the practical effect of suppressing
However, the Orito Court failed to consider that the same risk is also posed by private
possession of obscenity, which it held protected in StanL. Furthermore, Orito was
premised on the notion that obscenity received no First Amendment protection; thus,
the government prevailed on a mere showing of "rational basis." Id. at 143-44; see aLso
infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text (suggesting that obscenity should be
protected speech and then proscribed upon a finding of a compelling governmental
interest).
110. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
111. See 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1995) (prohibiting the interstate transportation of
obscene materials); United States v. 12,200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123,
128 (1973) (holding that even materials which are intended solely for private use can
be prohibited from being transported interstate).
112. Se Kim, supra note 6, at 434; cf. Huelster, supra note 30, at 886 (suggesting an
approach that would place the liability on the user, since the materials would not have
entered the community "but for the user requesting the transmission").
113. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
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speech that could not be directly suppressed."' Furthermore, in the
context of the Internet, a local standard encourages prosecutors to
forum shop for conservative districts, which could allow one
community's strict standards to become the standard for the entire
nation."' Lastly, applying local standards to the Internet does little
to further the fundamental policy consideration of Miller. that
communities should be able to insulate themselves from exposure to
objectionable materials."
6
IV. INDECENCY ON THE INTERNET
The Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between speech which
is legally obscene under Miller," and indecent speech." 8 While
government needs no justification for regulating obscene speech,"9
the Court applies a strict scrutiny standard to the permissible scope of
governmental regulations of indecent speech. 2 ' In short, the
government may regulate indecent speech in order to promote a
compelling government interest, but "it must do so by narrowly drawn
regulations designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily
interfering with First Amendment freedoms."' 2' However, when
applying this standard to the various forms of communicative technolo-
gy, the Court has recognized that the different characteristics of each
medium "justify differences in First Amendment standards applied to
them." 22
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court upheld the exercise of the
FCC's authority to regulate the broadcast of indecent speech.1'2 The
114. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
118. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740 (1978). Indecent speech has been
defined as that which does not conform to accepted standards of morality. Id.
119. The limited exception is that obscene speech is protected in the privacy of
one's home. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
120. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
121. Id. at 126 (quoting Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637
(1980)). However, if the law sweeps into protected areas of speech, it is unconstitution-
ally overbroad. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940).
122. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969); see also Pacifica,
438 U.S. at 744 (stating that "indecency is largely a function of context-it cannot be
adequately judged in the abstract"); Messagev supra note 5, at 1063 (arguing that the
similarities between technological characteristics of the different media "should not be
the crucial factor in determining the protection a message receives under the First
Amendment").
123. Paczfica, 438 U.S. at 726. The FCC's determination arose from a daytime
broadcast of satiric humorist George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue which listed
and repeated words such as "shit, piss, fuck, cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits."
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Court based its holding on two compelling governmental interests: (1)
the pervasive broadcast signals intrude into the privacy of one's home;
and (2) the protection of children, as broadcasting is "uniquely
accessible to children, even those too young to read."124  The Court
explained that the pervasively intrusive nature of broadcast speech
renders impossible any prior warnings of offensive programming
content; thus, an unwilling listener could not avoid the offense until
it is too late." The Court also noted that broadcast communication
is uniquely accessible to children, and relied on its previous holding
that "the government's interest in the well-being of its youth and in
supporting parents' claim to authority in their own household justified
the regulation of otherwise protected expression." 6 However, the
Court was conscious of not reducing the adult population to hearing
"only what is fit for children,"" and expressly emphasized the
narrowness of its holding."s
Lower federal courts have refused to apply the Pacifica holding to
regulations of indecent cable television programming." In Crzz v.
Id. at 751-55 (Appendix to the Opinion of the Court).
124. Id. at 748 (stating that, in the privacy of one's home, the right to be left alone
"plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder") (citing Rowan v. Post
Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970)).
125. Id. at 748-49 (asserting that the argument that one may avoid "further offense
by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy
for an assault is to run away after the first blow").
126. Id. at 749 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968))
(internal quotations omitted). The Court also distinguished its previous holding in
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), where a man wore ajacket reading "Fuck the
Draft" into a California courthouse. The Court recognized that, outside the home, the
balance between an offensive speaker and the unwilling listener may tip in favor of the
speaker, but government may prohibit certain intrusions into the privacy of the home.
Id. at 749 n.27. Furthermore, "[a]lthough Cohen's written message might have been
incomprehensible to a first grader, Pacifica's broadcast could have enlarged a child's
vocabulary in an instant." Id. at 749.
127. Id. at 750 n.28 (citing Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
128. Id. at 750. The narrowness of Pacificds holding is supported by the Supreme
Court's decision in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983), in which
the Court struck down a federal statute prohibiting the unsolicited mailings of
contraceptive advertisements. The Court held that the government may not "prohibit
speech as intrusive unless the 'captive' audience cannot avoid objectionable speech."
Id. at 72 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 542
(1980)). Although the Court acknowledged that particular recipients of objectionable
materials may be offended, they could "effectively avoid further bombardment of their
sensibilities simply by averting their eyes." Id. at 72 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). To the Court, the burden of having to throw away objectionable
materials was acceptable when compared to the First Amendment issues at stake. Id.
129. See, e.g., Community Television v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah 1985),
aff"d sub nom., Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986), afd, 480 U.S. 926
(1987); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1985); Community Television v. Roy
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Ferre, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the different
characteristics of cable television and broadcasting justify different
treatment of the two when determining the permissible scope of the
government's regulation of indecent speech."s Unlike broadcasting,
cable television is not an uninvited intrusion into individual privacy
because subscribers must take affirmative steps to bring it into the
home and to acquire additional programming, such as Home Box
Office (HBO). '' Moreover, the court concluded that the
government's interest in protecting children could be adequately
safeguarded through parental control devices such as a "lockbox" or
"parental key."8 2  These devices, which enable parents to exert
control over materials accessed by their children, are further supple-
mented by the cable company's guides that give prior warnings of
programming containing objectionable materials."3 In short, the
court concluded that the government had failed to justify a total ban
on cable television as the least intrusive means of furthering the two
compelling interests of Pacica: invasion of privacy and protection of
children.
The Supreme Court also had occasion to pass upon the constitution-
ality of "indecency" regulations in the context of telephone communi-
cations, in Sable Communications of Calfornia, Inc. v. FCC."a' The Sable
Court affirmed the district court's injunction against enforcement of
section 223(b) of the Communications Act of 1934,' which banned
indecent interstate telephone communications commonly known as
City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah 1982); Home Box Office v. Wilkinson, 531 F. Supp.
987 (D. Utah 1982).
130. Cruz, 755 F.2d at 1420; see Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct.
2445, 2456-57 (1994) (holding that the relaxed standard of scrutiny of broadcast was
not applicable to regulations of cable television because of the fundamental differences
between these two types of media); see also Angelyn M. Wright, Indecent Exposure on the
Information Superhighway: Regulating Pornography on Integrated Broadband Telecommunica-
tions Networks, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 465, 479 n.97 (comparing the important
characteristics of cable television and broadcasting) (citing Community Television, 555 F.
Supp. at 1167)).
131. Cruz, 755 F.2d at 1420. Furthermore, if the subscriber is dissatisfied with the
cable service, he may cancel it at any time. Id.
132. Id. The court also noted that parental control over cable television program-
ming greatly exceeds their ability to control broadcasting, for "[algain, parents must
decide whether to allow Cablevision into the home." Id.
133. Id.; see Community Television v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099, 1114 (D. Utah
1985) (rejecting the argument that the state could step in where the parents are
indifferent to or have neglected their duty to limit children's access to indecent
materials); cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (stating that the
.prohibition against sales to minors does not bar parents who so desire from purchasing
the magazines for their children").
134. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
135. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1988).
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"dial-a-porn."136 The Court conceded that the government had
demonstrated a compelling interest in protecting children and
unwilling listeners from exposure to indecent sexual messages;
however, it held that section 223(b) was not narrowly drawn to achieve
these purposes.3 7 The Court distinguished Pacifica on the basis that
the "dial-it medium requires the listener to take affirmative steps to
receive the communication.""s Thus, unlike the "captive audience"
of radio broadcast, an individual who places and pays for the tele-
phone call is not an unwilling listener, and can avoid unwanted
exposure to the message.'3 9 Moreover, the Court concluded that the
FCC's credit card, access code and scrambling rules were effective
solutions to serve the government's interest in protecting children.1"
Therefore, the total ban on such communications was held unconstitu-
tional, for it was not the least restrictive means."'
The general principle that emerges from Pacifica, Sable, and their
progeny is that where individuals have sufficient control over the
dissemination of objectionable materials, the government may not step
in and decide what individuals may listen to, view or read. 42 Of
course, the degree of control over content depends on the medium
carrying the message. In light of the various media, the Court has
effectively created a "spectrum of control" for the electronic me-
dia. 43 At one end of the spectrum is broadcasting, which comes into
136. Sable, 492 U.S. at 115-16.
137. Id. at 119. The Court held that the state's interest in protecting the physical
and psychological well-being of children extends even to shielding them from materials
which would not be deemed obscene under adult standards. Id. at 126 (citing Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968)).
138. Id. at 127-28.
139. Id. at 128.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 130-31. The federal parties insisted that the FCC rules cited by the Court
were not effective because "enterprising youngsters could and would evade the rules
and gain access to communications from which they should be shielded." Id. at 128.
However, the Court rejected this argument, noting that there was no evidence in the
record to substantiate this claim, since the FCC's rules had yet to be tested over time.
Id. at 128-29. Therefore, the Court left open the possibility that, in the future, a total
ban might be constitutional.
142. See Message, supra note 5, at 1077. The obvious corollary to this principle is that
the less control the user has, the more room for government intervention. Id. at 1080.
But cf. supra note 66 (discussing instances in which the Court has permitted the
government to regulate obscenity outside the home despite the fact that in doing so,
it has taken on a paternalistic role of making individuals' decisions for them).
143. Message, supra note 5, at 1080; Philip H. Miller, Note, New Technology, Old
Problem: Determining the First Amendment Status of Electronic Information Seroices, 61
FORDHAm L REv. 1147, 1153-54 (1993).
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the home without invitation,' and whose audience (which often
includes children) cannot be effectively forewarned. Somewhere in the
middle is cable television, which can only be accessed by affirmative
steps and with awareness of programming content. At the opposite
end of the spectrum is the telephone, whose users must take deliberate
steps to tap into services such as "dial-a-porn."
Where does the Internet fit into all of this? Could the government
argue that a total ban on indecency over the Internet is the only
effective means of furthering the interests of protecting children and
unwilling users?' 5 The answer depends on the amount of control
users possess over content assimilation. One commentator suggests
that while "BBSs do not fit neatly into any traditional category of
media, BBSs are more likely to fall towards the 'least intrusive' end of
the media spectrum."'46 Like cable and "dial-a-porn," BBS users
must take affirmative steps to access such services; hence, they can
hardly complain about any uninvited intrusions of privacy.'
4 7
Apart from the "invitation" issue, the ultimate determination still
remains: can users adequately protect themselves and their children
from objectionable materials?'" Critics have argued that children's
144. Contra Gate, supra note 8, at 41-42 (challenging the notion that broadcast is an
uninvited intrusion).
145. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Star. 56, 133-34
(1996) (making it a federal crime to produce or make available an indecent
communication to a minor, punishable by a fine up to $100,000 or imprisonment of up
to two years).
146. Kim, supra note 6, at 437; see Edward J. Naughton, Is Cyberspace a Public Forum?
Computer Bulletin Boards, Free Speech, and State Action, 81 GEo. LJ. 409, 412 (1992).
147. See Gallagher, supra note 85, at 205; Eric C. Jensen, An Electronic Soapbox:
Computer BuUetin Boards and the First Amendment, 39 FED. COMM. L.J. 217, 238-39 (1987);
Miller, supra note 155, at 1192; see also Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance
and User Contro" Renewing the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive
Media, 104 YALE L.J. 1619, 1632 (1995) (contending that user control in the context of
the Internet involves more than the privacy issue; it also entails two other important
attributes: the ability to identify the content of the transmission and the ability to screen
out objectionable content).
148. Even the issue of invitation, in the context of the Internet, is suspect. Unlike
broadcasting, "dial-a-porn" and cable television users invite these media forms into their
homes, arguably with an "expectation" or general awareness of their content. Although
a computer user who affirmatively accesses a BBS known to contain particularly
objectionable materials may be truly "inviting" that BBS into his or her home, an
Internet user in general may not have the same expectation of content. Thus, the
general Internet user may be more likened to the "captive" broadcast listener in the
sense that the only way to avoid exposure to indecent speech would be to refrain from
connecting into the Internet in the first place. That is a result that the Court may be
unwilling to accept. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (stating that
the broadcast audience is captive because "prior warnings cannot completely protect the
listener or viewer from unexpected program content") (emphasis added). It remains
open to debate whether a user of the Internet's general services "invites" this technology
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access to computer networks is too difficult to control because today's
parents are not computer literate enough to effectively exercise
parental control.'49 However, there are "less restrictive" alternatives
that restore control to parents and users without having to resort to
paternalistic, content-based regulations, and such means would not
require extensive parental involvement.150  For instance, parents
could install locking devices similar to those found on cable boxes that
would either deny access to specific Internet services or provide a flag
that objectionable content is found in a certain location.151 Similarly,
the providers of particular Internet services, where indecent content
is generally found, could be required to deny access to anyone who
could not provide a credit card, a security code and proof of age.
152
Furthermore, computer software companies have already begun the
development of software programs that can filter out a predetermined
set of words that a parent does not want their child to read. 5'
into his or her home any more than an individual who turns on the radio.
149. See Cate, supra note 8, at 45 (stating that children are generally more computer
literate than their parents); Kim, supra note 6, at 438 (discussing the level of computer
literacy in children).
150. See infra notes 152-54, 159 and accompanying text; Message, supra note 5, at
1080 (arguing that the preferable method of regulation is to restore user control, rather
than content-based regulations); Wright, supra note 130, at 493 (arguing that a
regulatory scheme that focuses on user control over the flow of information is more
appropriate because it requires less regulatory efforts, allows a wider range of services
which are in demand, and promotes access to a diversity of information); Censorship in
Cyberspace, ECONOMIST, Apr. 8, 1995, at 17 (stating that it is more appropriate to
empower parents to control what their children do on-line) [hereinafter Censorship];
Joshua Quittner, lice Raid on the Ne TIME, April 3, 1995, at 63 (quoting Harvard
University Law Professor Lawrence Tribe who asserted that, although there is a
legitimate need in protecting children from exposure to harmful materials on the
Internet, such interest is better served by enabling parents to screen the information
at home rather than by an outright ban).
151. See Kim, supra note 6, at 438; see also Censorship, supra note 150, at 17 (reporting
that Playboy warns Internet visitors that "naked women are ahead," and that Prodigy
and America Online define which services require parental approval).
152. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 134
(1996) (providing a defense to certain criminal prosecutions for those who have
restricted access to indecent "communication by requiring use of a verified credit card,
debit account, adult access code, or adult personal identification number"); Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 130-31 (1989); cf. Branscomb, supra
note 29, at 1952; Kim, supra note 6, at 438 (suggesting that this practice could be
enforced by imposing liability on BBS operators who violate this requirement).
153. A consortium of computer software and networking companies, including
Microsoft, Inc., Apple Computer, IBM, AT&T, Time Warner Inc., America Online,
Prodigy and CompuServe are expected to have products available next year that will
enable parents to control their children's computer use. Self-Policing: The Way to Handle
On-Line Porn, TACOMA NEWS TRIB., Sept. 18, 1995, at A6. A similar consortium
consisting of Microsoft, Progressive Networks and Netscape have announced a plan to
develop a rating system similar to the one already used for movies. Joshua Quitmer,
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Some argue that these technological procedures will not effectively
protect children and adults from objectionable materials. They claim
that existing technology cannot feasibly filter out or flag all unwanted
messages because there are too many Internet postings, the postings
come from so many different locations, and software filters cannot
screen out images, the wide variety of colloquialisms, or symbolic
terms. 15 4 Furthermore, even if the technology can work effectively,
there will always be determined children who will eventually find ways
to circumvent the restrictions and enter into prohibited territory.1
55
The Supreme Court explicitly rejected this argument in Sable, where
the Court found that the FCC's rules regarding credit cards, access
codes, and scrambling devices represented a "feasible and effective"
means to further the government's interest in protecting children.
15 6
Furthermore, in his concurring opinion in Sable, Justice Scalia stated
that "a wholesale prohibition upon adults access to indecent speech
cannot be adopted merely because the FCC's alternate proposal could
be circumvented by as few children as the evidence suggests."157 The
flip-side to the risks inherent when children access the Internet is that
adults will be reduced to reading "only what is fit for children."158
Perhaps only time will tell whether technological innovations and
non-content-based regulations will sufficiently protect children from
How Parents Can Filter Out the Naughty Bits, TIME, July 3, 1995, at 45; see also Berman,
supra note 147, at 1632 (stating that the major Internet services already have a type of
identifying data, known as a header, which could serve as a basis for screening out
objectionable content); Rimm, supra note 8, at 1859 n.21 (stating that schools and
parents can implement address filters that can "limit access only to known, acceptable
locations").
154. See Meyer, supra note 7, at 1983-87. But cf Rimm, supra note 8, at 1861 n.21
(stating that several research labs and universities are currently developing software, that
might assist network operators in scanning databases to identify patterns in images
which could locate the presence of nudity and other activities involving sexually explicit
content). One commentator agrees that most parents lack the capability or resources
to implement a site-blocking scheme because there are too many new World Wide Web
sites and Usenet groups announced each day. Id. at 1859 n.21 (suggesting the need to
develop a national or international rating system to help parents and schools implement
appropriate safeguards).
155. See Branscomb, supra note 29, at 1952 n.95; Meyer, supra note 7, at 1989
(maintaining that the very structure of the Internet, which was designed to enable
rerouting around obstacles, makes it almost impossible to effectuate the blocking of
access to a particular Internet file or service); Rimm, supra note 8, at 1858-59, n.21
(describing a multitude of methods by which determined users can access "banned"
Usenet groups); Censorship, supra note 150, at 17 (stating that children can still sneak
dirty magazines from their parents).
156. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 125, 128-29 (1989). But
see supra note 141
157. Sabe, 492 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring).
158. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
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exposure to indecent messages or images. If these procedures are
sufficient to protect children, then a total ban would be unconstitution-
al for failure to use the least restrictive means. However, if time
teaches us that too many children are exposed to too much indecent
content, then Sable suggests that a total ban may be necessary.'5 9 As
Justice Scalia points out, the question becomes "how few children
render the risk unacceptable[?] " " Arguably, the government's
interest in protecting adults from unwanted exposure cannot justify a
total ban because, like "dial-a-porn" and cable television, the Internet
user must take affirmative steps to bring the world of cyberspace into
the home. Users are not required to connect into the Internet.
Instead, they do so at their own pleasure and can be forewarned of
objectionable content. 1
V. LIABILrIY OF SYSTEM OPERATORS FOR USERS' MESSAGES
An important corollary to a discussion of what material a person can
(or should) be liable for is an analysis of who can be liable for such
material. As the case of United States v. Thomas demonstrates, a BBS
operator can be criminally prosecuted for actively engaging in the
transmission of obscene materials over the Internet1 62 Despite this,
the question remains whether sysops can be vicariously liable for the
actions of users who post or send obscene or indecent materials
through their networks. To date, there are no reported cases that have
ruled on this issue. However, lower federal courts and at least one
state court have had the opportunity to rule on vicarious sysop liability
in the context of copyright infringement and defamation. "
In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., a suit was brought against
CompuServe for making available to its subscribers an allegedly
defamatory statement made in a publication carried on CompuServe's
159. Sabe, 492 U.S. at 129. But see Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L No.
104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 134 (1996) (providing a good-faith defense to those who use
reasonable and effective means to restrict access to minors, "including any method
which is feasible under available technology"). Furthermore, legislative history reveals
that the "conferees intend that this defense be construed broadly to avoid impairing the
growth of on-line communications through a regime of vicarious liability." H.R. REP.
No. 458, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1996 WL 46795 (1996).
160. Sable, 492 U.S. at 132 (Scalia, J., concurring).
161. See supra note 151; Mesage, supra note 5, at 1095 (arguing that the "tastes of
the many need not be held hostage to the particular sensibilities of the few, or vice
versa."); Quitmer, supra note 153, at 45 (stating that CompuServe, a major Internet
service provider, posts a written notice to its users "to be careful when they venture
forth").
162. United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701, 708 (6th Cir. 1996).
163. See infra notes 164-71 and accompanying text.
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database."6  Although CompuServe could decline to carry a given
publication, once it decided to carry it, Compuserve had little or no
editorial control over the content.165 The court analogized a sysop's
computerized database to the more traditional news vendors (public
library, book store, and newsstand), and concluded that a "national
distributor of hundreds of periodicals has no duty to monitor each
issue of every periodical it distributes. Such a rule would be an
impermissible burden on the First Amendment." " Thus, the court
held that the appropriate standard of review was whether CompuServe
knew or had reason to know of the allegedly defamatory
statements.
16 7
In Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services,
Inc., plaintiffs sued Netcom (a BBS) for copyright infringement when
one of Netcom's users posted a copyrighted article on Netcom's
BBS.'" The district court held that Netcom could not be held liable
for direct infringement because Netcom did not take any affirmative
steps directly resulting in the infringement, other than installing and
maintaining a Usenet system that allowed its subscribers to post
messages onto the system. 69 Netcom argued that subjecting a BBS
to liability for direct infringement under these circumstances would
164. Cubby v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
165. Id. at 140.
166. Id. (quoting Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 139 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985)). The court further commented that applying a lower
standard of review for electronic new distributors "would impose an undue burden on
the free flow of information." Id.
167. Id. at 140-41. In a similar case, a NewYork state court held that Prodigy could
be held liable for distributing a defamatory statement which was posted by one of its
users. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May
24, 1995) (unpublished opinion). The court rejected Prodigy's claim that it served
merely as a passive conduit, and focused on the fact that Prodigy had actually exerted
editorial control over its network and had appointed board leaders to ensure conformity
with its editorial standards. Id. at *6. Thus, Prodigy's "hands-on" approach concerning
its editorial control "opened the company up to liability even though it did not have
knowledge of the communication at issue." Goldman, supra note 7, at 1099-1102.
168. Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1362 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
169. Id. at 1373. The court concluded that Netcom's actions where closely akin to
those of an owner of a publicly-used copying machine, whose liability is analyzed "under
the rubric of contributory infringement, not direct infringement." Id. at 1369. The
facts of Netcom were complicated by a letter sent to Netcom by Plaintiffs demanding that
the infringing user (Erlich) be kept off the BBS. Id. at 1373. However, Plaintiffs
refused Netcom's request to prove ownership of the copyrights, and Netcom refused to
kick Erlich off its BBS. Id. at 1367-68. Thus, since the infringing work remained on
Netcom's BBS for a period of time after Netcom had actually received notice, the court
denied Netcom's motion for summaryjudgment on the claim for contributory infringe-
ment. Id. at 1381.
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force Usenet servers to perform the impossible task of screening every
piece of information coming through their system.' 70 The court
agreed and stated that requiring Usenet servers to screen all messages
coming through their systems "could have a serious chilling effect on
what some say may turn out to be the best public forum for free
speech yet devised."'
In deciding whether sysops should be vicariously liable for the
obscene or indecent messages posted by their users, courts will have to
draw analogies between the sysops and more traditional First Amend-
ment actors. Because sysops play a multitude of roles, they do not fit
neatly into any one category. Rather, they face a "'sliding scale' of
analogous roles running from primary publisher to secondary
publisher to common carrier."'72 Primary publishers, such as newspa-
pers, have virtually total control over all content that appears in the
materials that they publish. 7 Secondary publishers have little or no
editorial control over content, and generally cannot be held liable
unless they know or had reason to know of the "defamatory (or
obscene) nature of the material they publish."7 4 Common carriers,
such as telephone companies, must transmit all messages regardless of
the content,"¢ and generally are not liable for the statements of
170. Id. at 1379.
171. Id. at 1377. The court rejected, as unworkable, a theory of infringement that
extended liability to:
[C]ountless parties whose role in the infringement is nothing more than
setting up and operating a system that is necessary for the functioning of the
Internet. ... Billions of bits of data flow through the Internet and are
necessarily stored on servers throughout the network and it is thus practically
impossible to screen out infringing bits from noninfringing bits.
Id. at 1372. Cf. supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text (discussing the impossibility
of screening out the obscene materials from the non-obscene materials).
172. Faucette, supra note 3, at 1172; seeJensen, supra note 147, at 244 (asserting that
computer bulletin boards have attributes associated with publishers, secondary
publishers, and common carriers); DavidJ. Loundy, -Law: Legal Issues Affecting Computer
Information Systems and System Operator Liability, 3 ALB. LJ. SCI. & TECH. 79, 89 (1993);
Schlachter, supra note 165, at 99-100, 137; Message, supra note 5, at 1067 (asserting that
a sysop acts like a common carrier when they allow users to communicate with each
other via e-mail, but they act like secondary distributors when they provide access to a
variety of electronic databases). Problems arise when courts, faced with a new
technology, attempt to apply legal doctrines which "were formulated in a world of
magazines, books, and film." Faucette, supra note 13, at 1181; see LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1007 (2d ed. 1988) (contending that the law has been
unable to keep up with the pace of technological change) ;Jonathan Gilbert, Comment,
Computer Bulletin Board Operator Liability for Users' Misuse, 54 FoRDHAM L. REV. 439
(1985).
173. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
174. Faucette, supra note 13, at 1172; see Schlachter, supra note 165, at 115-16.
175. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 (1979); see David K. Mcgraw,
Sexual Harassment in Cyberspace: The Problem of Unwelcome E-Mail, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER
19961
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others.
176
Sysops, who have a diminished ability to effectively exert editorial
control over their users' messages, should be closely analogized to
secondary publishers, which generally cannot be liable unless they
know or had reason to know of the nature of the content that they
carry.' However, a "reason to know" standard, in the context of
criminal prosecutions, may run up against the constitutional require-
ment of scienter: the requisite degree of mens rea" In Smith v.
Calfornia, the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that estab-
lished strict liability for booksellers who possessed obscene books,
regardless of whether they had knowledge of the books' contents.'79
The ordinance essentially imposed an obligation on the bookseller to
become aware of the contents of every book in his shop."8 Thus,
the Court concluded that the public's access to reading material would
be greatly limited because the bookseller would have to restrict his
sales to those books that he actually inspected.' Although the
& TECH. L.J. 491, 504 (1995); Schlachter, supra note 165, at 115.
176. See Faucette, supra note 13, at 1172-73; Jensen, supra note 162, at 250 (reciting
three policy reasons why courts afford more protection to common carriers: first, to
protect the public's right to quick and continuous communication service; second, to
permit the public utility to comply with its statutory requirement of providing access to
everyone; and third, the practical recognition that they do not exert control over the
messages, but operate as a conduit); Schlachter, supra note 167, at 119; Robert Charles,
Note, Computer Bulletin Boards and Defamation: Who Should Be Liable? Under What
Standard?, 2J.L. & TECH. 121, 132 n.72 (1987); cf. Huelster, supra note 30, at 872 n.46
(stating that courts have developed a three-prong test to determine what qualifies as a
common carrier "First, the carrier must have a 'quasi-public' nature. Second, a carrier
must use standard business practices, not allowing case-by-case decisions about 'whether
and on what terms to deal.' Third, the customer must be able to 'transmit intelligence
of their own design and choosing.'") (citations omitted).
177. See Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(comparing sysops to traditional news vendors such as a public library, a book store, or
a newsstand); Faucette, supra note 13, at 1174; Gallagher, supra note 85, at 198 (stating
that on-line services, like libraries and bookstores, function more as secondary
distributors). But see Goldman, supra note 6, at 1102-03 (suggesting that commercial
access providers, such as CompuServe and Prodigy may be treated as common carriers);
Mcgraw, supra note 175, at 504 (asserting that network service providers are more
analogous to telephone companies, which are not liable for the content of the
communications they carry); Message, supra note 5, at 1092-93 (arguing that a sysop is
more of a conduit than an editor and is unlikely to be liable for the content that it is
compelled to carry).
178. See Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793, 1797 (1994); Mishkin v. New York,
383 U.S. 502, 511 (1966) (stating that the scienter requirement serves to "avoid the
hazard of self-censorship of constitutionally protected material and to compensate for
the ambiguities inherent in the definition of obscenity.")
179. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959).
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Court did not pass on the requisite level of knowledge constitutionally
required for obscenity prosecutions, it did suggest that the circumstanc-
es might warrant an inference that the bookseller was aware of the
book's contents.
8 2
In Hamling v. United States, the Court elaborated on Smith's scienter
requirement, and held that it is constitutionally sufficient that an
individual have knowledge or reason to know of the contents,
character and nature of materials that he distributed.8 3  However,
the Court's liberal treatment of the term "knowledge" and the inherent
uncertainty of already vague obscenity standards,"s chills a great deal
of constitutionally protected speech, especially when applied to
Internet system operators."8 Like the bookstore owner in Smith, a
sysop has only a limited ability to monitor the large volume of content
transmitted through its network."8s Although a sysop may be more
able than a bookseller to implement a computerized software system
to monitor illegal content, sysops could not eliminate all such
content."7 There is simply too much to monitor, and even the
installation of software scanning programs could not effectively
182. Id. at 154.
183. Hamlingv. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123 (1975) (arguing that to require that
defendant had actual knowledge of the material's legal status would allow the
"defendant to avoid prosecution simply by claiming that he had not brushed up on the
law"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957) (stating that the defendant must
have a "sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by
common understanding and practices") (quoting United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1,
7-8 (1947)).
184. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 315-16 (1977) (Stevens,J., dissenting)
(arguing that ascertainment of the obscenity standards is too subjective to identify
criminal conduct and to delineate the boundaries of the First Amendment's protec-
tion); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 79-80 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Brockwell, supra note 49, at 137 (asserting that the vagueness of Mil/er's
standards of "prurient interest" and "patently offensive" is further compounded when
measured against the vague terms of "community standards" and "average person").
185. Cf. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 515 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
that vague standards promote selective and arbitrary enforcement and lessen the degree
to which an individual has notice of what is proscribed); Paris, 413 U.S. at 87-91
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
186. See Goldman, supra note 6, at 1100 (claiming that "Smith stands for the
proposition that distributors of large amounts of written material should not be held
liable for random amounts of obscenity contained therein."); Faucette, supra note 13,
at 1177; Jensen, supra note 147, at 219, 248; Kim, supra note 6, at 422, 425; Message,
supra note 5, at 1084 (asserting that interactivity and infinite capacity will reduce the
sysops editorial control); Only Disconnect: Can Pornography in Cyberspace be Regulated?,
ECONOMIST, July 1, 1995, at 17; Charles Levendosky, Cyber Censors: Big Brother Threatens
to Oversee the Internet, LA. DAILYJ., Apr. 5, 1995, at 6.
187. See infra notes 188-191 and accompanying text.
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separate the obscene from the non-obscene.ss At most, scanning
programs could search for certain key words.'89 But, given the
complexity and vagueness of the obscenity definition, no system could
take into account factors such as "average person" or "contemporary
community standard" or "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific
value.""9 It is unlikely that someone will ever develop software that
can identify (or know) obscenity just by seeing it.191
To protect against criminal liability, sysops would have to manually
inspect each posted message or develop software that envelops far too
much speech. Manual inspection would put the sysops in the
same censorship role that the Court guarded against in Smith, and
overbroad application of scanning software will chill too much
constitutionally protected speech.9 3  Moreover, with respect to
indecency regulations, sysops face a potential conundrum. If the sysop
can effectively filter out indecent content, then a total ban is not the
"least restrictive" means.' However, if the sysop cannot effectively
filter out indecent content, then it arguably cannot be held liable as a
secondary publisher."9 ' Thus, while a "constructive knowledge"
standard for criminal prosecutions renders Smith virtually meaningless,
an "actual knowledge" standard eliminates the sysops' incentive to
188. See Berman, supra note 147, at 1634 (arguing that even if such screening were
possible, it would unduly restrict the free flow of information and diversity in the on-
line world); Meyer, supra note 7, at 1980-84 (arguing that any attempt to police Internet
images or text is impossible).
189. But see Rimm, supra note 8 (describing the development of a technology that
could possibly search for and screen out sexual imagery).
190. See Goldman, supra note 6, at 1090-91, 1112.
191. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(claiming that although he could not attempt to define obscenity, he knew it when he
saw it).
192. See Faucette, supra note 13, at 1165. Furthermore, there will be a gaping hole
left in even the most comprehensive attempts by sysops to censor sexually explicit
materials because users' e-mail may not be accessed without their consent. Id. at 1182
n.60 (citing the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100
Stat. 1848, which is codified as amended in various sections of Title 18 of the United
States Code); Goldman, supra note 6, at 1100-01; Handelman, supra note 6, at 712 n.21.
193. See Loftus E. Becker Jr., The Liability of Computer Bulletin Board Operators for
Defamation Posted by Others, 22 CoNN. L. REv. 203, 230 n.125 (1989); Goldman, supra
note 6, at 1117 (asserting that sysops, faced with ambiguous standards, will either shut
down operations or search every file and delete those that the sysop believes contain
obscenity); Kim, supra note 6, at 423 (maintaining that most sysops could not afford to
comply with regulations that required constant monitoring, and as a result, legitimate
speech would be chilled); Schlachter, supra note 167, at 125 (arguing that excessive
sysop liability will reduce the availability of not only obscene, but also constitutionally
protected speech).
194. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 22
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censor protected speech.1
96
VI. CONCLUSION: REFLECTIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
We have come a long way in over two hundred years since the
Framers saw fit to protect our individual liberties through the Bill of
Rights. We have witnessed the advancement of technological
innovations such as the telephone, radio, television, cable television,
fax machine, computer, and now the Internet. The introduction of
each new technology has been accompanied by forceful government
censorship efforts. 97 But, as Justice Stewart stated: "Censorship
reflects a society's lack of confidence in itself. It is a hallmark of an
authoritarian regime. Long ago those who wrote our First Amendment
chartered a different course. They believed a society can be truly
strong only when it is truly free.""° The Framers knew how critically
important free speech is to a civilized society, which may be why they
placed this invaluable protection in the First Amendment.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Roth v. United States, immaculate-
ly conceived the notion that the First Amendment did not protect a
certain class of speech that is "utterly without redeeming social
importance. ""' The Roth decision, itself, is predicated on some type
of late 1950s homogeneous belief that there exists a universally (or at
least nationally) accepted class of speech that lacks social value, and
that such speech can be readily distinguished from valuable
speech."0  Roth, Miller and their progeny have provoked sharp
criticism for their failure to provide a workable definition of obscenity,
one which "adequately protects First Amendment values."20'
196. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977); seeFaucette, supra note 13, at 1177-
78; Loundy, supra note 172, at 103; Schlachter, supra note 167, at 134 (arguing that a
constructive knowledge standard is unduly burdensome); see aLso H.R. REP. No. 458,
104th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1996 WL 46795, at *161 (suggesting that the attention is
focused on "bad actors and not those who lack knowledge of a violation or whose
actions are equivalent to those of common carriers"). However, the new Act itself
explicitly states that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to treat interactive
computer services as common carriers... ." Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 135 (1996).
197. See supra note 41.
198. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 498 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
199. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
200. Justice Brennan has claimed that the Court has always "demanded that
'sensitive tools' be used to carry out the 'separation of legitimate from illegitimate
speech.'" Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 79 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958)).
201. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 513 n.7 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that "the bulk of scholarly commentary is of the opinion that the Supreme Court's
resolution of and basic approach to the First Amendment issues' involved in obscenity
laws 'is incorrect .... '") (citing ATroRNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY,
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Even Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion in Pope v. Illinois,
suggested the need for the Court to reexamine Miller °2 Scalia is not
alone. Many Supreme Court Justices have repeatedly argued that
obscenity, like indecency, should receive First Amendment protection
and only then be constitutionally suppressed where the government
demonstrates a compelling interest. 23 The most notable compelling
government interest cited is where the manner of distribution involves
exposure to minors or to unwilling adults.2 °  Others have even gone
further and asserted that the government should have the right to
condemn sexist and violent pornography.205 Whatever compelling
FINAL REPORT 261 (July 1986)).
202. Pope, 481 U.S. at 505 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that even introduction
of the "fabled 'reasonable man' is of little help in the inquiry").
203. See infra note 204.
204. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 133-35 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Pope, 481 U.S. at 507 (Brennan, J., dissenting); I& at 518
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Stanley Court "recognized that there are legiti-
mate reasons for the State to regulate obscenity protecting children and protecting the
sensibilities of unwilling viewers"); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 141-42 (1974)
(Brennan,J., dissenting); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 143 (1973) (holding that
Congress could reasonably determine that a prohibition upon interstate transportation
of obscenity is necessary to prevent a "legislatively determined risk of ultimate exposure
to juveniles or to the public and the harm that exposure could cause"); Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 106-07 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf. Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969)
(distinguishing private possession from public distribution on the grounds that the
former did not entail a danger of exposure to minors or unwilling adults); Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-43 (1968); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967)
(per curiam) (reversing convictions of distributing obscene materials because there were
no claims that "the statute in question reflected a specific and limited state concern for
juveniles .... [and no] suggestion of an assault upon individual privacy by publication
in a manner so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid
exposure . . . .") (citations omitted); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964)
(holding that the interest in preventing dissemination of obscene material to children
does not justify a total suppression of such material).
205. See, e.g., Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography and
Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 9-20 (1985) (arguing that pornography exploits,
subordinates, suppresses, and degrades women); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography
as Defamation and Discrimination, 71 B.U. L. REV. 793, 801-03 (1991) (suggesting that
pornography incites abusive and aggressive treatment of women); Kevin W. Saunders,
Media Vrolence and the Obscenity Exzception to the First Amendment, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 107, 166-67 (1994) (arguing that violent pornography should be denied constitutional
protection under the "fighting words" exception established in Chaplinshy). But see
Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin, and Women's Liberation: Against Porn-Suppression, 72 TEXAS L. REV.
1097, 1100.01 (1994) (contending that suppressing pornography will actually have the
effect of weakening women's liberation efforts); Meyer, supra note 7, at 1974-79
(claiming that censorship of pornography will only reinforce ignorance and repression
of sexuality, which create the problems in the first place); Nadine Strossen, A Feminist
Critique of The'Feminist Critique, 79 VA. L REv. 1099, 1173 (1993) (claiming that there
is no credible evidence linking exposure to sexist, violent imagery and sexist, violent
[Vol. 22
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interest the Court might accept for governmental suppression of
obscenity would fare better than merely holding obscenity outside the
bounds of the First Amendment completely.0 6
How does all of this relate to the Internet? Perhaps the application
of the current obscenity standard to the Internet will expose the
vulnerability of the obscenity doctrine's underlying rationales.0 7
Since the Internet lacks meaningful geographical boundaries,10 the
"contemporary community standard" is misplaced. Moreover, the
private nature of Internet communications has blurred the line
between public distribution and private possession of sexual materials,
which further highlights the problem with a local or state "community
standard." The policy behind applying the community
standard-enabling communities to protect themselves from exposure
to objectionable materials-is no more justified than a community
protecting itself from private possession of obscenity (something the
Court has held permissible).2°
Under a standard tailored to the manner of distribution, the
ultimate issue for sexually-explicit content on the Internet would be
whether users could adequately control the content appearing on their
screen, as well as what their children could access. If technology
advances to the point where exposure to all unwanted material could
be thwarted, then the government would no longer have a compelling
interest in suppression.210 On the other hand, if technology fails to
effectively prevent the risk of exposure, then the government may
legitimately assert regulatory authority to further its compelling
interests. In the end, the likelihood of potential harm from exposure
must rise to a very significant level to justify the enormous chilling
behavior); George C. Thomas III, A Critique of the Anti-Pornography Syllogism, 52 MD. L.
REV. 122, 124 (1994) (suggesting that the lack of evidence of a causal link between porn
and rape is "more persuasive than the evidence to the contrary").
206. The Court has previously been able to allow more restrictive governmental
regulations of obscenity under a rational basis analysis, an approach that has perhaps
been the underlying source of debate among Justices over the years. However, if the
Court were to place obscenity in the proper First Amendment framework, then many
of the definitional problems such as vagueness, lack of sufficient notice, and community
standards, would also require reexamination.
207. See Chiu, supra note 90, at 207 (claiming that the process of computer network
communications "raises questions about the basic reasoning behind the regulation of
obscenity through local community standards, because local communities are arguably
not affected in the process").
208. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 109 and accompanying text (comparing the Court's rationale in
Stanley and Or/to).
210. The same would be true for "non-hard-core" pornography (classified as
"indecency"), regardless of this proposed scheme.
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effect that vague and overbroad laws will have on one of our most
precious and guarded rights, freedom of speech.
Sean Adam Shift
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